Case Study - The Tonkin Gulf Resolution: The Incident
During the summer of 1964 the United States was directing two ongoing naval operations in the Gulf of Tonkin, north of the 17th parallel off the coast of Vietnam. One operation involved South Vietnamese commandos, trained by the C.I.A., who would launch hit-and-run strikes on North Vietnamese coastal sites using very fast patrol boats. The other operation would send U.S. warships, equipped with sensitive electronic gear, to cruise to within eight miles of the North Vietnamese coast in order to trigger the operation of North Vietnamese radar installations and then take measurements of their locations and frequencies. The U.S. destroyer Maddox was engaged in such a mission off the North Vietnamese coast on August 1. The day before, several South Vietnamese patrol boats had raided North Vietnamese coastal positions in the same area.
On the morning of August 2, the Maddox was attacked by several North Vietnamese patrol boats. Several torpedoes missed their target, but machine gun fire hit the U.S. warship. There were no casualties. The Maddox had begun firing as soon as the patrol boats approached, sinking one patrol boat and damaging two others. Planes from the nearby U.S. aircraft carrier Ticonderoga assisted by strafing the enemy boats. When Johnson received word of the incident, he sent a stern warning to North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi. He also informed Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev that, while he did not wish to widen the war, the United States would not tolerate attacks by the North Vietnamese on U.S. warships in international waters. No acts of reprisal were ordered at the time. To underscore American determination, the Maddox, joined by a second destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, were ordered back into the same area the next day. Several South Vietnamese patrol boats also staged another hit-and-run mission in the area. During that evening, radar and sonar readings taken by the crews of the destroyers seemed to indicate that both U.S. destroyers were under attack. No enemy boats were actually seen and no hostile gunfire was heard. Nevertheless, both destroyers fired for several hours at the unseen attackers. Heavy rain that evening in the Tonkin Gulf contributed to the confusion. When Johnson was notified of the situation, he decided to order retaliation, and to ask Congress immediately for a resolution of support. (Several days later, analysis of the incident raised doubts that the two destroyers had actually come under attack. Johnson himself remarked to an aide, "Hell, those dumb stupid sailors were just shooting at flying fish.")
Questions
for class discussion
-
Some have argued that the North Vietnamese
were to blame for the incident, while others have maintained the United States
was at fault. Discuss the case that both sides might make.
-
Why
do you think that President Johnson went to Congress and the American people
immediately, rather than waiting for a full investigation of the second "attack"?
Some have argued that the North Vietnamese were to blame for the incident, while others have maintained the United States was at fault. Discuss the case that both sides might make.
Why do you think that President Johnson went to Congress and the American people immediately, rather than waiting for a full investigation of the second "attack"?
_____
Online resources to accompany the Teacher's Guide for The Fog of War, A Project of The Choices Program and Critical Oral History Project, Watson Insititute for International Studies — Brown University