The Cuban Missile Crisis—Three Perspectives
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Executive Committee Meeting Excerpts
Cabinet Room
[The committee is discussion tactical questions, including plans to stop a ship ( Grozny ) and a proposal for two daylight surveillance missions, morning and afternoon. This discussion is interrupted a few minutes into the meeting as the president reads a ticker item.]
Audio of this discussion is available from CNN Interactive.
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John Kennedy: [Reading] Premier Khrushchev told President Kennedy yesterday he would withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba if the United States withdrew its rockets from Turkey.
[Voices unclear]
Unidentified voice: He didn't really say that, did he?
John Kennedy: That may not be -- he may be putting out another letter.
[Mixed voices. Calls for Pierre Salinger.]
John Kennedy: That wasn't clear in the letter we received, was it?
Unidentified voice: No.
[Voices unclear]John Kennedy: Is he supposed to be putting out a letter he's written me or putting out a statement?
Pierre Salinger: Putting out a letter he wrote to you.
John Kennedy: Let's just -- uh -- keep on going [words unclear].
Unidentified voice: It's in a different statement.
Dean Rusk: Well, I think we better get -- uh -- [words unclear]. Will you check and be sure that the letter that's coming in on the ticker is the letter that we were seeing last night.
[Mixed voices]
John Kennedy: What's the advantage of the second mission?
Robert McNamara: It creates a pattern of increasing intensity of surveillance, Mr. President. We believe that we should do this. Now, personally I would recommend, although we don't need ...
Unidentified voice: Are there two eights?
Robert McNamara: Yes, two eights. On the missile sites [word unclear]. And I would also recommend, although we don't have to decide now, that we conduct a night surveillance mission tonight. There appears increasing evidence that they're working night and day on these sites. [Words unclear] two in daylight and one at night.
McGeorge Bundy: The night is laid on but not finally authorized?
[Mixed voices]
Unidentified voice: We believe there ought to be an announcement of that.
[Mixed voices]
Dean Rusk: I really think we ought to have a talk about the political part of this thing, because if we prolong it more than a few days on the basis of the withdrawal of these missiles from Turkey -- not from Turkey, from Cuba -- the Turkish thing hasn't been injected into this conversation in New York and it wasn't in the letter last night. It thus appears to be something quite new.
[Words unclear]
Robert McNamara: That's what worries me about the whole deal. Just go through that letter; to a layman it looks to be full of holes, and I think my proposal would be to be...
McGeorge Bundy: [interrupting] ... keeping the heat on.
Robert McNamara: Keep the heat on. This is why I would recommend the two daylight and the one night missions, and I fully agree we ought to put out an announcement that we are going to send the night mission over.
[Pause]
McGeorge Bundy: Which way do you want it to stand, that we approved it, Mr. President, subject to appeal, or do you want to hold it ...
Robert McNamara: [interrupting] We can hold it, Mr. President, we ...
[Voices unclear]
John Kennedy: I think we ought to go ahead if they want it, so it's all right with me. I think we might have one more conversation about it, however, at about six o'clock just in case during the day we get something.
Robert McNamara: There's plenty of time -- we keep it on alert.
John Kennedy: That's right. We plan to put it on unless there's something in the daytime.
McGeorge Bundy: Well the announcement can -- that is a complication. We can't very well make the announcement and not do it.
[After further exchange, the conclusion is to have the announcement all ready to go at the Pentagon.]
John Kennedy: I ought to have ... In case this is an accurate statement, where are we with our conversations with the Turks about the withdrawal of these ...
Paul Nitze: Hare says this is absolutely anathema, and as a matter of prestige and politics. George is ready with a report from Finletter.
George Ball: Yeah, we have a report from Finletter, and we've also got a report from Rome on the Italians which indicates that that would be relatively easy. Turkey creates more of a problem. We would have to work it out with the Turks on the basis of putting a Polaris in the waters, and even that might not be enough according to the judgment that we've had on the spot. We've got a -- we've got one paper on it already, and we're having put in under a NATO decision, and [words unclear] ...
Paul Nitze: The NATO requirement involves the whole question as to whether we are going to denuclearize NATO, and I would suggest that what you do is to say that we're prepared only to discuss Cuba at this time. After the Cuban thing is settled we can thereafter be prepared to discuss anything ...
John Kennedy: [interrupting] I don't think we can -- if this an accurate -- and this is the whole deal -- we just have to wait -- I don't think we can take the position ...
McGeorge Bundy: [interrupting] It's very odd, Mr. President, if he's changed his terms from a long letter to you and an urgent appeal from the Counselor [Fomin] only last night, set in a purely Cuban context, it seems to me we're well within our -- there's nothing wrong with our posture in sticking to that line.
John Kennedy: But let's wait and assume that this is an accurate report of what he's now proposing this morning -- there may have been changes over there -- a change over there.
McGeorge Bundy: He -- uh -- I still think he's in a difficult position to change it overnight having sent you a personal communication...
John Kennedy: [interrupting] Well now let's say he has changed it. This is his latest position.
McGeorge Bundy: I would answer back saying I would prefer to deal with your -- with your interesting proposals of last night.
John Kennedy: Well now that's just what we ought to be thinking about. We're going to be in an insupportable position in this matter if this becomes his proposal. In the first place, we last year tried to get the missiles out of there because they're not militarily useful, number one. Number two, it's going to -- to any man at the United Nations or any other rational man it will look like a very fair trade deal.
Paul Nitze: I don't think so. I don't think -- I think you would get support from the United Nations on the proposition, "Deal with this Cuban thing." We'll talk about other things later, but I think everybody else is worried that they'll be included in this great big trade, and it goes beyond Cuba...
Dean Rusk: [interrupting] That's true of the Allies; it would not be true of the neutrals.
McGeorge Bundy: No.
Dean Rusk: [words unclear] goes on at the moment, to think about this. One possibility would be to, if this is persistent ...
Unidentified voice: Why are you stopping, Mr. Secretary?
Dean Rusk: [Words unclear]
John Kennedy: [reading] A special message appeared to call for negotiations and both nations, Cuba and Turkey, should give their consent to the Untied Nations to visit their territories. Khrushchev said the Security Council of the Soviet Union was solemnly pledged not to use its territory as a bridgehead for an attack on Turkey, called for a similar pledge from the United States not to let its territory be used as a bridgehead for an attack on Cuba. Broadcast [words unclear] it was out of the question for the U.S. to abandon its Turkish military bases. Now we've known this was coming for a week -- uh -- we can't -- it's going to be hung up here now [words unclear].
[Mixed voices]
John Kennedy: How much negotiation have we had with the Turks?
Dean Rusk: We haven't talked with the Turks. The Turks have talked with us. The Turks have talked with us in -- uh -- NATO.
John Kennedy: Well, have we gone to the Turkish government before this came out this week? I've talked about it now for a week. Have we had any conversation in Turkey, with the Turks?
Dean Rusk: We've asked Finletter and Hare to give us their judgments on it. We've not actually talked to the Turks.
George Ball: We did it on a basis where if we talked to the Turks, I mean this would be an extremely unsettling business.
John Kennedy: Well this is unsettling now George, because he's got us in a pretty good spot here, because most people will regard this as not an unreasonable proposal, I'll just tell you that. In fact, in many ways ...
McGeorge Bundy: But what most people, Mr. President?
John Kennedy: I think you're going to find it very difficult to explain why we are going to take hostile military action in Cuba, against these sites -- what we've been thinking about -- the thing that he's saying is, "If you'll get yours out of Turkey, we'll get ours out of Cuba." I think we've got a very tough one here.
McGeorge Bundy: I don't see why we pick that track when he's offered us the other track, within the last 24 hours. You think the public one is serious?
[Words unclear]
John Kennedy: Yeah. I think you have to assume that this is their new and latest position and it's a public one.
Dean Rusk: What would you think of releasing the letter of yesterday?
[Pause]
McGeorge Bundy: I think it has a good deal of virtue.
John Kennedy: Yes, but I think we have to be now thinking about what our position's going to be on this one, because this is the one that's before us, and before the world.
[Short pause]
Theodore Sorensen: As between the two I think it clear that practically everyone here would favor the private proposal.
Dean Rusk: We're not being offered the choice -- we may not be offered the choice.
John Kennedy: But seriously, there are disadvantages also in the private one, which is a guarantee of Cuba. But in any case this is now his official [sic], and we can release this other one, and it's different, but this is the one that the Soviet government obviously is going on.
Paul Nitze: Isn't it possible that they're going on a dual track, one a public track and the other a private track; the private track is related to [word unclear], and the public track is one that's in order to confuse the public scene [words unclear] additional pressures.
John Kennedy: Possible ...
[Voices unclear]
Llewellyn Thompson: I think it's one that the Soviets take seriously.
Dean Rusk: I think, yes, I think that the -- uh -- NATO-Warsaw Pact arms problem is a separate problem and ought to be discussed between NATO and Warsaw Pact. They've got hundreds of missiles looking down the throat of every NATO country. And I think this is -- we have to get it into that context. The Cuba thing is a Western Hemisphere problem, an intrusion in the Western Hemisphere.
[Further discussion on NATO]
John Kennedy: I think it would be very desirable to tell [word unclear] that until we get time to think about it, this thing -- the fact of the matter is that we received a letter last night from Khrushchev with an entirely different proposal. Therefore we first ought to get clarification from the Soviet Union of what they're talking, at least give us -- as I say you're going to find a lot of people think this a rather reasonable condition.
John Kennedy: [Reading bits from something] Besides he must guarantee not to intervene in Turkey and we must do the same in Cuba . [Words unclear] Well, we know what the problem is there.
[Further discussion on NATO]
John Kennedy: He's put this out in a way that's caused maximum tension and embarrassment. It's not as if it was a private proposal, which would give us an opportunity to negotiate with the Turks. He's put it out in a way that the Turks are bound to say they don't agree to this. [Words unclear]
[Discussion on Khrushchev]
John Kennedy: He says he'd like to consider the following statement be issued -- this is Stevenson -- [reading] the United States does not have any territorial designs against Cuba, but of course we cannot tolerate Soviet-Cuban aggression against us or our sister republics [words unclear] the Soviet offer to withdraw weapons in Cuba [words unclear] assurance of our peaceful intentions towards Cuba. In the meantime it is imperative that further developments of Soviet bases stop and discussions proceed with the Secretary General of the United Nations in New York. Governor Stevenson recommends that such a statement be made in order to prevent the Soviets from capturing the peace offensive. Governor Stevenson also recommends that we not consider the Turkish offer as reported in the attached Reuters dispatch as an alternative or an addition to the Khrushchev proposal in his letter. I think that -- uh -- we ought to go at -- we ought to get a statement ready which will -- uh -- I'm not sure that -- which would -- uh -- these references to last night's -- back on that, number one. Number two something about the work on the bases stopping while we're going to have a chance to discuss these matters. I don't know what we're going to say on the Turkish matter.
Llewellyn Thompson: Khrushchev may have picked up the statement which Kreisky, the Austrian foreign minister, made day before yesterday -- has made and which he may think was inspired by us, in which he raised the question of Turkish...
Low Unidentified voice: Of course maybe the Russians got Kreisky to do it, too. [Pause -- very low voices on drafting details of something for 75 seconds]
Dean Rusk: And if we publish the letter of last night, Tommy, what other letters will get published [words unclear.]
Llewellyn Thompson: I think probably this -- uh --whole exchange, this refers -- uh -- starting with this crisis -- this refers to the previous letters. It starts out by saying, "I received your letter." I've got the feeling that if you have someone explaining the situation, you have to publish the exchange.
John Kennedy: I don't know. You perhaps don't have to put out the letter as much as you do the three proposals or so.
[Long pause. Voices mixed, occasional, and low]
Robert Kennedy: The first point being that this -- uh -- this question of Cuba and the [word unclear] must be resolved within the next few days; it can't wait. The negotiations and discussions must -- uh -- get on, and the work that is continuing despite our protests has been going on. So therefore it's got to be resolved quickly. Uh -- this action that has been taken is not an action just by the United States but is an action by all of the Latin American countries plus the United States. This has nothing to do with the security of the countries of Europe, which do have their own problems. Uh -- we would -- uh -- obviously consider negotiating the giving up of bases in -- uh -- Turkey if we can assure the -- uh -- Turks and the other European countries from whom these bases were emplaced that there can be some assurances given to them for their own security. This will entail inspection as we anticipate that there will be some inspection in Cuba and in the United States -- uh -- at the time that these bases are withdrawn from Cuba and we give assurances that we are not going to invade Cuba. Something along those lines.
[Pause. Low voices exchanging unclear views on U.S.- U.N. relations. A new message reported arriving.]
Robert Kennedy: I don't see how we can ask the Turks to give up their defense
Unidentified voice: What do you think they could...
Robert Kennedy: No --uh -- [word unclear] unless the Soviet Union is also going to give up their -- uh --
Voices: weapons.
Robert McNamara: Not only the weapons, but agree not to invade Turkey.
[Voices overlapping]
Robert McNamara: And allow inspection to ensure that they haven't.
Robert Kennedy: We would be glad for it [voices overlapping]. We think that's a very good point made by the Russians, and we would be glad to -- and we finally feel that this is a major breakthrough and we would be glad to discuss that. In the meantime this is a threat to the United States and not just that -- to all of Latin America and let's get that done.
Unidentified voice: I think that's tough on [word unclear] to say that this is what we want.
[Voices overlapping]
Robert McNamara: Well, Khrushchev's statement to U Thant is absolutely contradictory to his statement to the president. The question is which came first. I thought the reply to U Thant came first.
Dean Rusk: What's the statement to the president?
Robert McNamara: The long letter.
Unidentified voice: Oh.
[Mixed voices]
[There follows an inconclusive discussion of times of the messages.]
[Reel of tape ends here and the next reel begins with low voices and side conversations, not clear -- president not present. The gathering comes to order after about five minutes as Rusk begins to read from the Khrushchev public letter. He reads its highlights rapidly.]
Robert McNamara: Dean, how do you interpret the addition of still another condition over and above the letter that came in last night? We had one deal in the letter, and now we've got a different deal. And -- uh -- in relation ...
[Mixed voices; One: Shouldn't we point this out by letter?]
Robert McNamara: How can we negotiate with somebody who changes his deal before we even get a chance to reply and announces publicly the deal before we receive it?
McGeorge Bundy: I think there must have been an overruling in Moscow.
Unidentified voice: What does Tommy say?
Unidentified voice: [Words unclear] Bob, we've got three positions.
Llewellyn Thompson: [Words unclear] a long letter last night he wrote himself.
Dean Rusk: And was that sent out without clearances?
Llewellyn Thompson: Without clearances, yes.
[Mixed voices]
Robert McNamara: It completely changes the character of the deal we're likely to be able to make, and also therefore our action in the interim. So I [words unclear] really keep the pressure on [words unclear] the situation.
McGeorge Bundy: This should be knocked down publicly. A private -- let me suggest this scenario -- we knock this down publicly in the way we've just described, separating the issues, keeping attention on Cuba, and the four-point reply that Bob has framed. Privately we say to Khrushchev, "Look -- uh -- your public statement is a very dangerous one because -- uh -- it makes impossible immediate discussion of your private proposals and requires us to proceed urgently with the things that we have in mind. You'd better get straightened out."
Unidentified voice: This is exactly what I'd say.
John McCone: I think that's exactly right.
Unidentified voice: And we release the fact that there was the other letter?
McGeorge Bundy: No, we don't. I guess we say we are reluctant to release this letter which would display the inconsistency in your position, but we don't have very much time.
Robert McNamara: The point, Bobby, is he's changed the deal. [Words unclear] Before we even got the first letter translated, he added a completely new deal and he released it publicly, and under these circumstances [words unclear]
[Voices]
Robert Kennedy: What is the advantage? I don't know what -- where you are in 24 hours from now -- uh -- so we win that argument but what 24 hours...
[Voices]
Robert McNamara: We incorporate a new deal in our letter.
[Voices unclear and overlapping and someone says: Remove the missiles, clear the production sites, and then inspection.]
Robert Kennedy: Now the problem is going to be -- uh -- not just his fact that we have this exchange with him and [words unclear] but the fact that he's going to have a ploy publicly that's going to look rather satisfactorily at present. How are we going to have him do anything but take the ball away from us publicly, if we don't -- if we just write him a letter.
[Voices]
McGeorge Bundy: [Words unclear] to surface his earlier message. Bobby ...
Robert Kennedy: All of that. I think that we're going to have to, in the next three or four hours, not just put the ball completely in -- uh -- in his hands and allow him to do whatever he wants. We have an exchange with him and say he's double-crossed us, and we don't know which deal to accept, and then he writes back, and in the meantime he's got all they play throughout the world, and the fact that he [word unclear]
Robert McNamara: Just turn it down publicly.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but I think that's awful tough...
[Voice overlap]
John McCone: I don't think you can turn that down publicly without -- uh -- referring publicly to his letter of yesterday.
Robert Kennedy: I'd like to have the consideration of my thoughts [words unclear]. He's offered this deal -- uh -- [words unclear] that he will withdraw the bases in Cuba for assurance that we don't intend to invade. We've always given those assurances. We will be glad to give them again. He said, in his letter to me, he said that we were to permit inspection. Obviously that entails inspection not only of Cuba but entails inspection of the United States to ensure that we're not -- by United Nations observers -- to ensure that we're not getting ready to -- uh -- invade. Now this one of the things U Thant -- the bases in Cuba -- uh -- involve -- uh -- the security of the Western Hemisphere. This is not just a question of the United States. This is a question of all the Latin American countries, which have all joined together in this effort. Time is running out on us. This must be brought to fruition -- uh -- The question of the Turkish bases, we think that's excellent, that you brought that up, and that -- uh -- that uh -- there should be disarmament of the Turkish bases, but that has nothing to do with the security of the Western Hemisphere. It does have to do with the security of Turkey, and we would be happy, and we're sure the Turks would be, of making a similar arrangement in Turkey. We will withdraw the bases from Turkey if -- uh -- and allow [word unclear] inspection bases of -- uh -- of the Soviet Union and permit inspection there.
Unidentified voice: I think it's too complicated, Bobby.
Robert Kennedy: Well, I don't think it is.
John Kennedy: Wait, just, it seems to me the first thing we ought to try to do is not let the Turks issue some statement that's wholly unacceptable. So that before we've even had a chance to get our own diplomacy the first thing it seems to me we ought to emphasize is that [noises] But they've given us several different proposals in twenty-four hours. And work's got to stop today, before we talk about anything. At least then we're in a defensible position. The other thing is to not have the Turks making statements, so that this thing -- Khrushchev puts it out and the next thing the Turks say they won't accept it. Then whatever we do in Turkey -- in Cuba -- it seems to me he has set the groundwork to do something in Turkey. So I think we ought to have the Turks -- we ought to have a talk with the Turks because I think they've got to understand the peril that they're going to move in the next week. When we take some action in Cuba the chances are that he'll take some action in Turkey, and they ought to understand that. And in fact he may even come out and say that once [words unclear] he's tried to be fair and if we do any more about Cuba then he's going to do it to Turkey. So I think the Turks ought to think a little [noise]. We ought to try to get them not to respond to this till we've had a chance to consider what action we'll take. Now how long will it take to get in touch with the Turks?
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